Following the death of Mao Zedong, the Communist Party's Chairman and ruler of the People's Republic of China for near forty years, China was politically rudderless and in economic turmoil.
Following Mao's death, Hua Guofeng attempted to step into the late Chairman's gigantic, legendary shoes. However, his position was not secure, having only a scrawled note from the late leader to back his claim to be China's new Paramount Leader. Both leftists and rightists sought to wrest away control of the Party.
Jiang Qing, wife of Mao Zedong, in Yanan, probably winter 1940-1941. (Source: Wikipedia)
The first challenge came from very close to Mao. Jiang Qing, Mao's wife and leader of the infamous hardline leftist 'Gang of Four', was angry at being snubbed for Hua and audaciously tried to forge alterations to the Chairman's will, but was exposed and arrested for attempting a coup d'état.
With high-level support, Deng took this chance. Attacking the notion that no-one could question 'whatever Mao instructed or approved', Deng sarcastically labeled Hua the 'whatever faction' and openly challenged the supposed infallibility of China's late Chairman, and his right to appoint a successor. This was the beginning of the end for both Hua's rule and the old Mao-day ways of the CPC.
Reform and institutional change
Once in power not only did Deng gather enough support to overhaul the economy, push market reforms, and end 'class struggle', he looked to tackle institutional problems within the Party.
Long term planning and predictability
Hu Yaobang (left) converses with Chinese supreme leader Deng Xiaoping. (Source: CNS)
Factional disputes and internal power struggles still raged within the party after Deng's accession, with more liberal-minded figures such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang becoming casualties of hardline leftists in the eighties, and Deng Xiaoping needing to a embark on a daring last-gasp 'Southern Tour' to save his progressive economic reforms from repeal by conservatives in the early nineties.
From dictator to consensus
Was Bo Xilai a victim of his own ambitions? (Source: CNS)
Mao had had grand utopian visions for China, but the means he employed to try to bring about his idealized society were ruthless, 'necessarily exceeding proper limits', to paraphrase his own words, and brought a string of disasters upon the People's Republic of China. It was this abuse of power that sparked the CPC's internal reforms.
In the final months of terminal illness, Mao anointed the relatively unknown Hua Guofeng as his successor. Yet following the Great Helmsman's death in 1976, the struggle for power and the direction of the Party and country was still ongoing.
Autocratic rule under the founder of the People's Republic of China had been turbulent to say the least, having witnessed the destructive chaos of the Cultural Revolution and famine-inducing Great Leap Forward.
In reaction to Mao's rule, developments following his death would eventually see checks and balances and group decision-making replace the dangerous cult of personality and supreme individual power that defined the Mao years. Avoiding such tumult and fostering stability became vital objectives.
These innovations were hard-fought but helped bring a measure of predictability to an otherwise opaque system, and mean that the tenures of leaders today are limited.
These innovations were hard-fought but helped bring a measure of predictability to an otherwise opaque system, and mean that the tenures of leaders today are limited.
Power struggles
Following Mao's death, Hua Guofeng attempted to step into the late Chairman's gigantic, legendary shoes. However, his position was not secure, having only a scrawled note from the late leader to back his claim to be China's new Paramount Leader. Both leftists and rightists sought to wrest away control of the Party.
Jiang Qing, wife of Mao Zedong, in Yanan, probably winter 1940-1941. (Source: Wikipedia)
The first challenge came from very close to Mao. Jiang Qing, Mao's wife and leader of the infamous hardline leftist 'Gang of Four', was angry at being snubbed for Hua and audaciously tried to forge alterations to the Chairman's will, but was exposed and arrested for attempting a coup d'état.
Though Jiang was out of the way, this would leave Hua in an impossible spot. Deng Xiaoping, himself a revered revolutionary-time leader, would be an obvious rival to Hua's nascent leadership should he be allowed back from the political wildness.
And, as it was Madame Jiang who had engineered Deng's recent and second period in exile, Hua was forced to take the decision to rehabilitate Deng, or else appear to be backing the Gang of Four, who were seen as responsible for many murderous rampages during the Cultural Revolution. Thus Deng was pardoned and entered the fray.
And, as it was Madame Jiang who had engineered Deng's recent and second period in exile, Hua was forced to take the decision to rehabilitate Deng, or else appear to be backing the Gang of Four, who were seen as responsible for many murderous rampages during the Cultural Revolution. Thus Deng was pardoned and entered the fray.
Deng Xiaoping takes over
With high-level support, Deng took this chance. Attacking the notion that no-one could question 'whatever Mao instructed or approved', Deng sarcastically labeled Hua the 'whatever faction' and openly challenged the supposed infallibility of China's late Chairman, and his right to appoint a successor. This was the beginning of the end for both Hua's rule and the old Mao-day ways of the CPC.
By the momentous Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC in December 1978, seen as a pivotal moment in the history that sent the PRC in the direction of reform and opening up, Deng had out-manoeuvred Hua. Deng became China's new Paramount Leader, and set about transforming the country.
Now it was up to Deng to restore the faith of the Chinese people, rescue the economy and ensure the very survival of the CPC. This would require reversing much of what had come before.
Now it was up to Deng to restore the faith of the Chinese people, rescue the economy and ensure the very survival of the CPC. This would require reversing much of what had come before.
Reform and institutional change
Once in power not only did Deng gather enough support to overhaul the economy, push market reforms, and end 'class struggle', he looked to tackle institutional problems within the Party.
Deng, one of many high-profile victims of Mao's many purges, specifically sought to end unchecked, autocratic rule, which had opened the door to disasters such as the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
The diminutive Sichuanese moved to introduce instead collective leadership and install checks and balances in order to prevent abuses of power that had previously seen misguided policies and ruthless means shape China.
The diminutive Sichuanese moved to introduce instead collective leadership and install checks and balances in order to prevent abuses of power that had previously seen misguided policies and ruthless means shape China.
Deng would now make decisions in consultation with a small group of senior figures, in which he would try to balance between what could broadly be described as reformers and conservatives within the Party.
He introduced measures to put a stop to life-time tenure and remove superannuated leaders from powerful positions. He also inaugurated the idea of a limit of two five-year terms for top officials, and a set retirement ages, though these would not be implemented until later.
Long term planning and predictability
Hu Yaobang (left) converses with Chinese supreme leader Deng Xiaoping. (Source: CNS)
Factional disputes and internal power struggles still raged within the party after Deng's accession, with more liberal-minded figures such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang becoming casualties of hardline leftists in the eighties, and Deng Xiaoping needing to a embark on a daring last-gasp 'Southern Tour' to save his progressive economic reforms from repeal by conservatives in the early nineties.
Yet, the legacy of this is that today the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee is now China's de facto top decision-making body and makes decisions according to consensus (though it is not well understood how this body functions), and power is not concentrated so much in one individual.
Even the post of Chairman was abolished, with the top leader once again being a General Secretary, thus avoiding comparison with Mao. Further, since Deng's death in 1997, China has not had a supreme leader.
Following these changes, China managed a smooth transitions in 1997, and previously in 2002, when Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji made way for Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao respectively as the men in charge of the CPC and the Chinese economy.
Following these changes, China managed a smooth transitions in 1997, and previously in 2002, when Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji made way for Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao respectively as the men in charge of the CPC and the Chinese economy.
This also means in November at the 18th National Congress of the CPC, some changes can be predicted. The incumbent General Secretary Hu will, after 10 years at the helm, step aside for a new generation of leaders, and seven of the nine Politburo Standing Committee positions are expected to become vacant if the retirement age is enforced.
From dictator to consensus
Was Bo Xilai a victim of his own ambitions? (Source: CNS)
Mao had had grand utopian visions for China, but the means he employed to try to bring about his idealized society were ruthless, 'necessarily exceeding proper limits', to paraphrase his own words, and brought a string of disasters upon the People's Republic of China. It was this abuse of power that sparked the CPC's internal reforms.
His legacy however, was not to be torn down. Despite dismantling autocratic rule and lifetime tenure, reversing two decades of policies, and questioning some past events, Mao Zedong was not to be exposed to open criticism, and his mistakes were said to be those of a "great Marxist, proletarian revolutionary, militarist, and general".
Yet, lessons were learned from his reign, and an apprehension of such charismatic figures remains. Some even believe Bo Xilai, a Politburo member and Party chief of Chongqing until he was felled by scandal early this year, was a victim of internal politics amid fears over his boundless ambition.
Yet, lessons were learned from his reign, and an apprehension of such charismatic figures remains. Some even believe Bo Xilai, a Politburo member and Party chief of Chongqing until he was felled by scandal early this year, was a victim of internal politics amid fears over his boundless ambition.
Along with this, China is also keen on avoiding a situation in which a Gorbachev figure could bring in sweeping reforms, such as those seen to have precipitated the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Soviet Union.
The upshot of the CPC's reforms is that China's next leader, widely believed to be Xi Jinping, could be viewed as the weakest leader of the PRC yet in terms of personal control, with China perceived by some to be moving further along the road of collective leadership and pluralism and away from individual power.
The upshot of the CPC's reforms is that China's next leader, widely believed to be Xi Jinping, could be viewed as the weakest leader of the PRC yet in terms of personal control, with China perceived by some to be moving further along the road of collective leadership and pluralism and away from individual power.
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